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DIVINE OMNISCIENCE 
AND HUMAN FREEDOM: 
A 'MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE' PERSPECTIVE 
David Basinger 
The traditional prima facie incompatibility between divine omniscience and 
human freedom is well known. To say that an individual is free with respect to 
a given action has usually meant in this context that the individual has it within 
his or her power at the time in question either to perform or to refrain from 
performing the action. Thus, if Ted Kennedy was free with respect to running 
for the Presidency in 1984, he had it within his power either to run or not to 
run at the moment he made his final decision not to become a candidate. To say 
that God is omniscient has generally meant that God has always known all true 
propositions, including propositions about future states of affairs. Thus, if God 
is omniscient, he knew 100 years ago that Ted Kennedy would choose not to 
run for the Presidency in 1984. But if this is so, then how can we say that Ted 
Kennedy actually had it within his power to run for the Presidency in 1984? For 
if Ted Kennedy actually had it within his power to bring it about that the 
proposition 'Ted Kennedy will run for the Presidency in 1984" is true, then he 
had it within his power to bring it about that the proposition which God believed 
100 years ago-"Ted Kennedy will not run for the Presidency in 1984"-is 
false. But, of course, what God (or anyone else) knows cannot be false. Accord-
ingly, we must assume that if God knew 100 years ago that Ted Kennedy would 
choose not to run for the Presidency in 1984, Ted Kennedy did not actually have 
it within his power to choose to run and thus that his decision was not, in fact, 
freely made.! 
The common response to this prima facie problem is also well known. It is 
correct to say that if God is omniscient, he knew 100 years ago, for example, 
that Ted Kennedy would choose not to run for the Presidency in 1984. And it 
is correct to say that if Ted Kennedy was free with respect to the Presidency, 
he had it within his power either to run or to refrain from running. But it in no 
sense follows from the fact that Ted Kennedy had it within his power either to 
run or to refrain from running that he had it within his power to bring it about 
that God held a false belief 100 years ago. An omniscient God cannot be tricked 
or surprised. He always holds (has always held) the appropriate belief. If Ted 
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Kennedy had freely chosen to run for the Presidency, God would have known this 
fact 100 years ago. Ted Kennedy, as a matter of fact, freely chose not to run. Ac-
cordingly, God, being omniscient, held this belief 100 years ago. 2 
In short, the argument runs, since what God knew 100 years ago about Ken-
nedy's Presidential aspirations was contingent upon the choice Kennedy would 
freely make, the fact that God had such knowledge in no sense limits Kennedy's 
freedom in this matter. 
Not all philosophers, of course, believe this line of reasoning to be an adequate 
counter to the traditional challenge. But even if we assume that it is, some 
philosophers will argue that a serious problem remains. To affirm the traditional 
response is, as we have seen, to affirm in some sense that what God knows in the 
past about some human actions is contingent upon what humans will freely decide 
to do in the future. But this seems to imply that what we freely do at present can in 
some important sense determine states of affairs in the past. It seems to imply, for 
example, that what God knew about Ted Kennedy's 1984 Presidential aspirations 
100 years ago was in some sense determined by what Ted Kennedy freely decided 
to do this year. But the concept of such 'retrodetermination' troubles some 
philosophers. Dennis Ahem, for example, believes that it is implausible to assume 
that "somehow one [who is freely choosing to perform a given action] has control 
over past beliefs" and is thus "free to determine which possible world existed prior 
to the present moment."3 Nelson Pike seems to agree. Nothing that a person can do 
presently, he argues, "could have ... the slightest bearing on whether Yahweh held 
a certain belief eighty years earlier."4 
In short, some philosophers maintain that it is never in any person's power at a 
time t to act in such a way that the past (relative to t) would have been different 
from what it actually was. But if we can in no sense determine what God believed 
in the past about our present actions and God's past beliefs can't be wrong, then it 
appears that we must admit that we are not free to do what we want. We will do 
what God believed in the past (has always believed) we will do. 
Or, to state the essence of this contemporary argument more succinctly, it ap-
pears to many that human freedom is only compatible with divine omniscience if 
what God knows about our future actions is contingent upon what we will in fact do 
and that God's knowledge can only be contingent upon what we will do if we can 
in some sense by our actions determine beliefs held by God in the past. But, it is ar-
gued, it is impossible for us in any sense by our present actions to determine the 
past-e. g. , to determine God's past beliefs about our actions. And, accordingly, if 
God is omniscient, we cannot be considered free. 
This line of reasoning seems to me to be one of the most serious (and interesting) 
challenges to the compatibility of human freedom and divine omniscience, and 
thus I believe it is worthy of further consideration. 
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I 
However, before we turn to an analysis of this argument itself, it is essential that 
we specify exactly what it will mean for the purposes of our discussion to maintain 
that God is omniscient. Some philosophers presuppose in this context that an om-
niscient God possesses only what we shall call simple foreknowledge-i.e., 
knowledge at any given time t' of what will in fact happen in the actual world at any 
given time f. For instance, they would only presuppose that what God knew about 
Ted Kennedy 100 years ago were propositions such as the following: 
(1) Ted Kennedy will freely choose to run for the Presidency in 1980. 
(2) Ted Kennedy will freely chose not to run for the Presidency in 1984. 
But other philosophers believe that God possesses middle knowledge. They be-
lieve, that is, not only that God knows what will in fact happen in the actual world 
or what could in fact happen in all possible worlds, but also what would in fact hap-
pen in every possible situation, induding what every possible free creature would 
do in every situation in which that creature could find itself. 5 
Thus, a God possessing middle know ledge would not have known 100 years ago 
only those decisions which Ted Kennedy in fact makes in the actual world or could 
possibly have made in any possible world. He would have known what Ted Ken-
nedy would do in any possible situation. He would, for example, have known the 
truth (or falsity) of propositions such as the following: 
(3) If Ted Kennedy runs for the Presidency in 1968, he will freely choose 
Tip O'Neill as his running mate. 
(4) If Ted Kennedy is elected President in 1980 and is free to choose to run 
again in 1984, he will freely choose to run again. 
The fact that Ted Kennedy neither ran for the Presidency in 1968 nor was elected 
President in 1980, and thus did not in fact have the opportunity to make the deci-
sions in question, is not seen as relevant. 
But is it reasonable to assume God possesses such knowledge? Could God really 
know what decisions Ted Kennedy would freely be making if the context in which 
Kennedy functions were different than it actually is? It might appear at first glance 
that an omniscient God could know such things. For example, it might appear that 
if it were the case that Kennedy had been elected President in 1980 and was free to 
choose to run again in 1984, then either he would choose freely to run or he would 
not choose freely to run. In other words, it might appear that either (4) or 
(5) If Ted Kennedy is elected President in 1980 and is free to choose to run 
again in 1984, he will not choose freely to run again 
is true. We as humans, as Alvin Plantinga argues, "may not know what the answer 
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is" in such cases. But "one thing we would take for granted," he argues, "is that 
there is a right answer here ... (W)e would reject out of hand ... the suggestion that 
there simply is none."6 And if either (4) or (5) is in fact true, then it would seem to 
follow that an omniscient God would know which is true. 
Not all philosophers, however, are convinced. Robert Adams, for example, 
grants that if hypothetical conditionals such as (4) or (5) are in fact true (or false), 
then we cannot consistently doubt that an omniscient God has middle knowledge. 
But he doubts that propositions of this sort "ever were, or ever will be true."7 And 
others for various other reasons agree. Thus, we cannot simply assume naivel y that 
middle knowledge is possible. But I do not believe that anyone has yet de-
monstrated to the satisfaction of the general philosophical community that God 
could not possess knowledge of this sort. 
Moreover, it seems to me that, whether traditional theists consciously recognize 
it or not, most do in fact consider middle knowledge to be an important, necessary 
divine attribute. Consider, for example, those traditional theists who face difficult 
decisions and ask God for guidance. Such theists are not normally asking only for 
guidance based on God's knowledge of what will in fact happen or on his predic-
tive abilities. Rather, they normally assume (in keeping with a middle knowledge 
perspective) that God knows what would happen, given any of the possible op-
tions, and will give guidance on this basis. 
Accordingly, it seems to me that when discussing alleged tensions between di-
vine omniscience and human freedom, it is justifiable and important that we as-
sume (at least for the sake of argument) that God possesses middle knowledge. 
II 
With this clarification in mind, we can now more clearly state the major question 
at hand: Does it follow from the fact that a God with middle knowledge foreknows 
free human actions that we as humans can in some sense presently determine or in-
fluence the past? I shall begin by making what I consider to be the strongest case 
possible for the claim that we can. 
Let us assume that at 7:00 a.m. on January 31, 1983, a person named Bob hears 
on the radio about a shipwreck which occurred at 4:00 p.m. on January 30, 1983. 
The announcer states that about half of those on the ship were killed but that the 
identities of the dead have not yet been established. Bob is immediately seized 
with fear because his brother was on that ship, and in desperation he utters the fol-
lowing prayer: "God, please let my brother be among the living." 
Now as an emotional outpouring, such a prayer is quite understandable. But 
could such a prayer be causally efficacious in the intended sense? Is it meaningful 
to assume that what Bob prayed at 7:00 a.m. on the 31st could in any sense have in-
fluenced or determined what actually happened at 4:00 p.m. on the 30th? 
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It might initially appear that the answer is no. The accident, it might be argued, 
occurred before the prayer. Accordingly, at the time of the prayer it was already an 
established fact that Bob's brother was dead or alive. And since even God cannot 
change the past-i.e., bring it about that what was the case was in fact not the 
case-it follows that Bob's prayer for his brother's safety could not have been 
causally efficacious in the sense he intended it. 
In one sense this line of reasoning is surely correct. Nothing, including prayers 
to God, can at a time e bring it about that what happened at an earlier time t' did not 
actually happen at ti. But there is another way oflooking at the situation. If God has 
middle knowledge, then he knew at 3:59 p.m. on the 30th (and at every other pre-
vious moment) that the ship would be wrecked. But he also knew at 3:59 p.m. on 
the 30th that when Bob heard about the crash on the 31st, he would pray for the 
safety of his brother. And he knew whether Bob's brother would, apart from divine 
intervention, live or die. 
Now let us assume that if God had considered the situation at 3:59 p.m. on the 
30th apart from Bob's prayer-to-be, he would have been inclined not to intervene. 
And let us assume that if God had not intervened, Bob's brother would have died. 
But let us further suppose that God is so impressed by Bob's foreseen devotion or 
so desires to increase Bob's faith (which God knows will occur if Bob's prayer is 
answered) that, solely because of Bob's prayer-to-be, he does in fact bring it about 
that Bob's brother survives the wreck. Could we not then in a meaningful sense 
claim that Bob's prayer at 7:00 a.m. on the 31st had influenced or determined the 
past? 
Or, to state the argument somewhat differently, we are assuming that God 
would not have intervened to save Bob's brother's life at 4:00 p.m. on the 30th if 
he had not believed at 3:59 p.m. on the 30th that Bob would pray for his brother at 
7:00 a. m. on the 31 st. But God would not have believed this fact about Bob on the 
30th if Bob had not actually decided freely to pray on the 31 st. That is, God would 
not have believed the statement "Bob will freely pray for his brother on the 31 sf' to 
be true at 3:59 p.m. on the 30th if it were not true that Bob did freely pray for his 
brother at 7:00 a.m. on the 31st. Accordingly, can it not be said that Bob's action 
on the 31 st did in a meaningful sense determine or influence the past? 
To respond to this question, we must first specify more exactly the sense in 
which it is being claimed that Bob has determined or influenced the past. It is, of 
course, not being argued that Bob's prayer is a sufficient causal condition for the 
survival of his brother since, given the scenario in question, divine intervention is 
a necessary causal factor. But is it being argued that Bob's prayer is a necessary 
causal condition for the survival of his brother? In one sense yes. It is true, given 
the scenario in question, that God would not have saved Bob's brother if Bob had 
not prayed. In short, in relation to those factors which motivated God to utilize his 
interventive ability in this case, it is being argued that Bob's prayer was necessary. 
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But it is not being argued that Bob's prayer was in any sense a necessary condition 
for the interventive activity itself. That is, it is not being argued that God's ability 
to intervene was in any sense causally dependent upon Bob's prayer. For God 
could, given the scenario in question, just as easily have intervened even if Bob 
had not prayed. 
Also, it must be emphasized, it is not being argued that Bob's prayer was in-
volved in any type of direct . ontological ' causal relationship with the survival of 
his brother. That is, it is not being argued that the act of praying, or the prayer it-
self, in any sense directly affected any of the natural causal factors related to the ac-
cident (or Bob's brother's survival)- e.g., the structure of the ship, the location of 
Bob's brother, the location of hazardous materials, the location of life-saving 
equipment, climatic factors, Bob's brother's state of mind, etc. The type of causa-
tion being defended is better identified as epistemological. What Bob's prayer 
brings about directly, it is being argued, is that God held a certain belief (that 
God's mind was in a certain state) before the accident occurred-a belief or state of 
mind which motivated God to become 'ontologically' involved in the situation. 
Certain aspects of this line of reasoning will not be challenged. I will grant for 
the sake of argument that if the Judeo-Christian God exists, he could intervene in 
the requisite sense. And I will grant that God might intervene at a time t1 solely or 
primarily because he believes at t1 that he will be requested to do so at time e. 
But the alleged 'causal' relationship between Bob's prayer at 7:00 a.m. on the 
31 st and God's belief concerning this prayer at 3:59 p.m. on the 30th is in need of 
further analysis. Is it really true in any sense that Bob's act of prayer on the 31 st 
brought it about (made it the case) that God believed on the 30th that Bob would 
utter this prayer? 
Given the scenario in question, God decides to save Bob's brother because he 
knows (in the actual world) at 3:59 p.m. on the 30th that 
(6) Bob will freely pray for his brother's safety at 7:00 a.m. on the 31st. 
But why is this proposition true in the actual world? Is it true, as the proponent of 
retrodeterrnination claims, because of something which Bob did at 7:00 a.m. on 
the 31st? If we assume that God has middle knowledge, it can be shown, I believe, 
that this is probably not the case. If God has middle knowledge, then he knew (in 
the actual world) at 3:59 p.m. on the 30th that the following propositions are true: 
(7) If Bob is free with respect to praying for his brother's safety at 7:00 
a.m. on the 31 st, he will freely pray for his brother. 
(8) Bob will be free with respect to praying for his brother's safety at 7:00 
a.m. on the 31st. 
And, of course, since (6) follows from (7) and (8), the fact that God believed (7) 
and (8) to be true at 3:59 p.m. on the 30th is sufficient to explain why God believed 
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(6) to be true at that time. Or, to state the point differently, if God has middle 
knowledge, then it is certainly possible that God believed (6) to be true at 3:59 
p.m. on the 30th because he believed (7) and (8) to be true at that time. 
However, it can be shown that neither (7) or (8) is true in the actual world on the 
30th because of anything which Bob did on the 31 st. Let us first look at (8)-the 
contention that Bob will in fact be free to pray on the 31 st. God, given our scenario 
and the assumption that he has middle knowledge, knew at 3:59 p.m. on the 30th 
(and at every moment before) that Bob would pray for his brother at 7:00 a.m. on 
the 31 st ifhe were free to do so-i.e., he knew that (7) was true. But let us suppose 
that although he knew (7) was true, God had not wanted Bob to pray for his brother 
on the 31 st-i. e. , let us assume that God had not wanted (6) to be true in the actual 
world. Given the type of freedom under consideration and the fact that (7) is true in 
the actual world, God could not have brought it about that Bob freely chose not to 
pray on the 31 st. But given (as we are assuming) that God can intervene in earthly 
affairs, he could have brought it about that Bob did not have the opportunity to pray 
freely for his brother on the 31 st. He could, for example, have caused the idea of 
praying to never enter Bob's consciousness. Or he could have caused Bob to be 
distracted every time he felt the desire to pray. 
Accordingly, it cannot be argued that (8) is true in the actual world because of 
anything Bob had done or could have done. Bob is free to pray in the actual world 
described in our scenario solely because of God's decision to make it so-i.e., be-
cause of God's decision to actualize a world in which it is true. This does not mean, 
of course, that it is God alone who determines whether (8) is true or false in all pos-
sible worlds. There are possible worlds, for example, in which Bob freely chooses 
not to tum on the radio at 7:00 a.m. on the 31 st and, thus, is himself responsible for 
the fact that he will not have the opportunity to choose to pray at that time. Or there 
are possible worlds in which Bob freely decides to commit suicide at 6:00 a. m. on 
the 31 st and, thereby, brings it about himself that (8) is not true. But there are ac-
tualizable worlds in which God does alone bring it about that Bob is free to pray on 
the 31st-e.g., a world in which Bob's decision to pray is the first 'choice' which 
God has allowed. And there may well be many actualizable worlds in which Bob 
(or Bob and God together) brings it about that (8) is true- e.g., a world in which 
Bob freely turns on the radio at 7:00 a.m. and is thus faced with the option of pray-
ing. 
But it is God alone who determines which actualizable world will in fact be ac-
tualized. More specifically, he alone has the power to determine if any actualizable 
world in which (8) is true (for whatever reason) will be actualized and if so, which 
one. And it is in this sense that it is true that God alone is responsible for the fact 
that Bob is free to pray on the 31st in the actual world. 
It might be tempting to assume that the situation is different with respect to (7)-
the contention that Bob will pray on the 31 st if free to do so. For the truth of (7) can 
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rightly be said to be based on the fact that Bob will freely choose to pray on the 31 st 
if given the opportunity. However, it can be shown that there is in fact no necessary 
correlation between what Bob, himself, actually did at 7:00 a.m. on the 31st and 
the truth of (7). 
We have been assuming that God knows at 3:59 p.m. on the 30th that Bob will 
freely pray for his brother at 7:00 a.m. and saves his brother for that reason. But let 
us again assume instead that although God knows Bob will freely pray for his 
brother if given the chance, God does not wish to save Bob's brother and thus, be-
cause he does not want to disappoint Bob, brings it about that Bob is not free to 
pray for his brother at 7:00 a.m. on the 31st. (7) is in this case still true. That is, it 
is still true that if Bob had been free, he would have prayed. And the fact that God 
knows that (7) is true is still relevant to how he acts. But in this case (6) is false. 
Bob will not actually pray at 7:00 a.m. on the 31st. So it can in no sense be said in 
this case that what Bob does in the actual world brings it about that (7) is true. 
Or let us assume that Bob dies unexpectedly on the 29th (or even that he dies at 
birth). It could still be true, given the coherence of middle knowledge, that Bob 
would have freely prayed for his brother's safety on the 31st if he had been given 
the opportunity. However, again in this case, it could not be said that (7) was true 
because of anything Bob had done. In fact, (7) would be true (or false) even if it is 
only the case that Bob could have (although has not) existed. 
But if Bob is not responsible for the truth of (7) or (8) in the actual world, then 
the argument that Bob has in fact, by his actions on the 31 st, determined the past 
fails. For if, as our scenario assumes, God's decision to save Bob's brother on the 
30th was motivated by his belief on the 30th that Bob would pray on the 31st-i.e., 
by his belief that (6) was true-and if it is possible that God's belief on the 30th that 
(7) and (8) were true is sufficient to explain his belief in (6) and if nothing which 
Bob did on the 31 st was responsible for God's belief on the 30th that (7) and (8) 
were true, then we are not forced to grant that it was Bob's act of prayer on the 31st 
which motivated God to save Bob's brother's life on the 30th. And to say this, of 
course, is to say that we need not grant that God's knowledge on the 30th of what 
Bob would do on the 31st (even though God acted upon this knowledge onhe 30th) 
necessarily entails any form of retrodetermination. 
It might be argued, however, that this line of reasoning generates an equally 
serious problem. If, as I have argued, Bob is not responsible for the truth of (7) or 
(8) in the actual world-i.e., if Bob does not bring it about by his actions on the 
31st either that it is true on the 30th that he will freely pray on the 31st if given the 
opportunity or that he will have this opportunity-then does it not follow that God 
is responsible for the truth of (7) and (8) in the actual world? And if this is so, then 
since in any world in which (7) and (8) are true, (6) must also be true-i.e., it must 
be true that Bob will freely pray~oes it not follow that it is God alone who is re-
sponsible in the actual world for the fact that Bob freely prays for this brother on 
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the 31st? But, given our definition offreedom, God cannot bring it about that any-
one choosesfreely to perform any action. Thus, if God is in fact responsible for the 
fact that Bob decides to pray on the 31st, then Bob's prayer was not freely offered 
and we again face an incompatibility between divine activity and meaningful 
human freedom. 
I have acknowledged that (8) is true in the actual world solely because of what 
God has done. But it does not follow from the fact that (7) is not true in the actual 
world because of anything Bob has done that God is any sense responsible for its 
truth. On the contrary, it can be shown, I believe, that God does not in any sense 
bring it about that (7) or any other hypothetical conditional of freedom is true. Con-
sider two distinct possible worlds, Wand W/, which are identical in every way 
(except for God's belief aboutthe future) until 7:00 a.m., Janurary 31,1983, when 
in W Bob freely chooses to pray for his brother while in W/ he freely chooses not 
to do so. And let us call this shared initial segment S. If Bob is in fact free with re-
spect to praying this time, then while it is certainly the case that, given S, Bob 
might freely choose to pray, or, given S, Bob might freely choose not to pray, it is 
not the case that, given the actualization of S, Bob can both freely pray and freely 
refrain from praying at 7:00 a.m. That is, while it is the case that if S is actualized, 
Bob will be free to pray or not to pray, he can in fact only make one decision. Or, 
stated differently yet, if, given the actualization of S, (7) is true, then it cannot be 
true, given the actualization of S, that 
(7/) If Bob is free with respect to praying for his brother's safety at 7:00 
a.m. on the 31st, he will freely refrain from praying. 
Now let us continue to assume, in keeping with our scenario, that, given the ac-
tualization of S, Bob will freely choose to pray-i.e., let us continue to assume (7) 
is true. Then God cannot actualize W/ or any other possible world in which (7/) is 
true. For to do so, God would obviously have to cause Bob to choose to do what, 
given the actualization of S, he would not have freely chosen to do. That is, God 
would have to make it the case that Bob was not truly free with respect to praying. 
In other words, if (7) is true, it is true in all actualizable worlds containing S. 
But given the type of freedom in question, in no possible world in which Bob is 
free with respect to praying for his brother can God determine what Bob will freely 
decide to do. Thus, it cannot be said that in W or any other actualizable world in 
which Bob is free to pray that he will freely pray because of any decision on God's 
part-i.e., in no actualizable world can it be said that God brought it about that (7) 
is true. Of course, as we have seen, God (given our present set of assumptions) has 
the power to bring it about that Bob is not free in the requisite sense and thus God 
can insure that the state of affairs described in the consequent of (7) does not occur. 
That is, there may well be actualizable worlds in which God brings it about that 
Bob doesn't pray. But in no such world can God bring it about that (7/) is true-
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i. e., bring it about that Bob freely chooses not to pray. (7) remains true in all such 
worlds. Given the type of freedom under discussion, the truth or falsity of all such 
hypothetical conditionals of freedom are outside of God's control. 
But who then is responsible for the truths of (7) in the actual world? The answer 
is that no one is responsible. (7) is true in all actualizable worlds, given our 
scenario, because it accurately describes what Bob will do if certain conditions ob-
tain. But since God (we are assuming) has no control over what individuals freely 
do and since hypothetical conditionals are true even if the relevant conditions 
never obtain, it cannot be said that either God or Bob brings it about that (7) is true. 
Given the assumed conherence of such hypotheticals, they simply are true. 
Moreover, given this analysis of (7), we can now strengthen our argument 
against retrodetermination in Bob's case. I have to this point argued only that God 
may have believed (6) to be true in the actual world on the 30th-i.e., he may have 
believed Bob would freely pray on the 30th because he believed (7) and (8) to be 
true at that time. [And this fact alone, we have seen, is sufficient to refute the claim 
that divine foreknowledge of human actions necessitates some form of retrodeter-
minism.] But given our analysis of (7), we can now state with more certainty why 
God, if he has middle knowledge, affirmed (6) on the 30th. God affirmed (6) at 
that time, it seems most reasonable to believe, because he knew at that time that (7) 
was true in all actualizable worlds and he knew that he had actualized a world in 
which (8) was true. And accordingly, since what Bob did on the 31st in no way 
brought it about that either (7) or (8) is true, we can now maintain with more cer-
tainty that Bob's decision to pray on the 31 st did not in fact bring it about that God 
believed (6) to be true on the 30th and thus was not responsible for the fact that God 
decided to save Bob's brother at that time. 
There is, however, another potential criticism which must be discussed briefly. 
Some will surely argue that if Bob's act of prayer on the 31 st is not responsible for 
the truth of (7) or (8), then, since (6) follows from (7) and (8), Bob's act of prayer 
on the 31st cannot be responsible for the truth of (6). But if Bob is not responsible 
for the truth of (6)-i.e., if Bob is not responsible for the fact that he will pray on 
the 31st-then it cannot be argued that Bob's act of prayer on the 31stis truly free. 
Such reasoning seems to me to be based on a subtle confusion. It does follow 
from the fact that Bob is not responsible for the truth of (7) and (8) in the actual 
world that Bob is not responsible for the fact that the actual world will contain his 
act of prayer as one of its components. God brought this about by his decision to 
actualize an actualizable world in which (8) is true. But to say that Bob did not by 
his prayer at 7:00 a.m. on the 31st bring it about that this action will occur as acom-
ponent in the actual world is not equivalent to saying that Bob did not, given the 
opportunity to pray at 7:00 a.m. on the 31st in the actual world, act freely. The 
former is a claim about Bob's control over the actualization of the actualizable ac-
tion in question. The latter is a claim about Bob's ability to perform the action 
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freely. And it simply does not follow from the fact that Bob's prayer at 7:00 a.m. 
is not responsible for the fact that this act of prayer will occur in the actual world 
that this act, itself, when performed in actual world, is not free.' 
We may conclude then, I believe, that there is no good basis for affirming re-
trodeterminism in Bob's case. Nor is there any reason to believe that such re-
trodeterminism would exist in any analogous situation. In all cases in which it is 
claimed that a God with middle knowledge knows at a given point in time what an 
individual will freely do at a later time, the response given in Bob's case would 
hold: God knows that the individual will in fact freely perform a certain action be-
cause he knows that the relevant hypothetical conditional of freedom is true and 
has decided to actualize a world in which the state of affairs described in the an-
tecedent of this conditional will obtain. 
This is not to say, of course, that other problems do not remain or that new ones 
are not generated. A God with middle knowledge, for example, obviously has a 
great deal of control over which possible free actions will in fact be actualized. He 
might, in fact, possess so much control that the concept of meaningful human free-
dom is greatly damaged. And it might still be argued by some that the traditional 
argument against the compatibility of divine omniscience and human freedom is 
successful. But it has been shown, I believe, that if God has middle knowledge, a 
fear of retrodetermination is not an adequate basis for questioning such compatibil-
ity.9 
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(6") It is 7:00 a.m. on the 31st, and Bob is freely praying for his brother's safety. 
(6"') Bob freely prayed for his brother's safety at 7:00 a.m. on the 31st. 
Bob's decision to pray at 7:00 a.m. on the 31st is, of course, a necessary (although not a sufficient) 
condition for the truth of (6") in the actual world. And Bob's decision to pray at 7:00 a.m. is also a 
necessary condition for the truth of (6"'). For, although (6") is false at any time at which (6"') is true, (6"') 
can only be true if (6") was in fact true at some previous time-i.e., (6"') can only be true if Bob did in 
fact make the choice in question at 7:00 a.m. on the 31st. 
But not only is (6") false at any time that (6) is true. (6) can only be true at any given time if (6") has 
never been true at any previous point in time. Accordingly, it cannot in any sense be said that (6) was 
true at 3:59 p.m. on the 30th because of the truth of (6")-Le., because of what Bob did at 7:00 a.m. on 
the 31 sl. 
9. I want to thank Bruce Reichenbach, Bernard Keating and George Mavrodes for helpful comments 
made on earlier drafts of this paper. 
